The objective of this paper is to understand why venture capitalists often syndicate their investments, and how syndication aects their post-investment involvement. We consider a venture capital investment model, in which the quality of investment projects is unknown. Depending on their level of experience, venture capitalists are more or less ecient at screening projects. Screening can also be improved by a second investor appraisal. Obtaining this second piece of information can be costly though, since the initial venture capitalist has to disclose the existence of the investment project to a second investor. The latter becomes de facto a potential competitor, reducing the initial venture capitalist's prots. In this setting, we rst establish that syndication can be a coordination device to prevent competition. We then investigate how the syndication decision aects the screening process, and explore the cost of syndication in terms of investment decisions or post-investment involvement of venture capitalists. We conclude with empirical predictions linking the level of experience of venture capitalists, the decision to syndicate, the level of post-investment involvement and the characteristics of the venture capital investments.
Introduction
Venture capitalists often look for nancial partners to complete their investments in start-up rms. This so-called syndication can either take place at the same round of nancing or be sequential, with new partners coming in at later rounds of nancing. Even taken in the most restrictive sense, syndication is widely observed: Brander, Amit and Antweiler (2002) report from Canadian data that 60 % of venture capital investments were syndicated in 1997. Wright and Lockett (2003) report from VentureEconomics and EVCA data that about 30% of venture capital investments were syndicated in Europe in 2001, compared to 60 % in the US. 1 The objective of this paper is to understand why venture capitalists syndicate and how syndication aects the eciency and the protability of the venture capital industry.
At the root of these questions is the source of value-added of venture capitalists. Venture capital investments can be successful because venture capitalists are good at selecting projects and/or because they enhance the protability of the projects they back by providing useful advice. Sahlman (1988 Sahlman ( , 1990 reports that venture capitalists spend a great deal of time to carefully select projects, and remain also deeply involved in the post-investment development of those projects. Emphasizing the importance of the selection process, Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995) estimate that only 1% of the projects received by venture capitalists obtain nancing. Gorman and Sahlman (1989) nd that venture capitalists have repeated interactions with the rms they invest in. This enables them to extract information on the quality of their investment, in order to terminate the less promising ventures (Gompers (1995) ). They can also monitor and directly control entrepreneurs (Lerner (1995) , Hellmann and Puri (2002) ), and provide managerial advice. 2 In line with the above empirical literature, we consider that the value added by venture capitalists is two-fold: their expertise allows them to spot the most protable projects and to enhance their value by providing valuable advice. However, we do not view these two activities as separate tasks: the eciency of the selection process determines the eectiveness of the venture capitalists' involvement. In our model, this interaction arises from the venture capitalist's eort being more valuable for high quality projects. Therefore, the decision to provide advice will depend on the perceived quality of the investment project. The important question is then: how can venture capitalists eciently select projects? The answer we propose in this paper is that syndication helps to gather information on the investment opportunities, which improves the selection process, and impacts the post-investment involvement of venture capitalists. 1 Hopp and Rieder (2006) document using German data that European gures are very sensitive to the industry considered: Biotech and Internet industries exhibit levels of syndication similar to their US counterparts. 2 The importance of this advising role has been extensively documented empirically in Gorman and Sahlman (1989) , Sahlman (1990) , Bygrave and Timmons (1992) , Gompers and Lerner (1999) , and more recently Hellmann and Puri (2002) . For theoretical treatments, see Schmidt (2003) , Repullo and Suarez (1999), or Casamatta (2003) .
To study these issues, we consider a model where a venture capitalist must decide whether or not to invest in a highly uncertain project, and whether or not to exert costly eort to improve the project's protability once investment is made. The venture capitalist can screen the project by generating an informative signal on the project's true quality. An important assumption is that the preciseness of his signal depends on his level of experience. On top of his signal, the venture capitalist has the opportunity to ask for a second evaluation, performed by another venture capitalist. However, obtaining this evaluation can be costly. Disclosing the existence of an investment opportunity to another venture capitalist makes him a potential rival: he could compete with the initial venture capitalist to obtain exclusive nancing of the project. From the point of view of the venture capitalist rst informed of a new project, revealing the existence of the project creates the conditions for prot-dissipating competition. In order to preserve part of his monopoly rents, the venture capitalist has no choice but to negotiate with his potential competitor, and share the project's surplus.
The main results of the model are the following. First, information can be gathered by forming a syndicate, i.e. by signing a co-investment, co-ownership contract between the two venture capitalists. Second, inexperienced venture capitalists do not fear potential competition because their evaluation of the project is not accurate enough to allow them to invest alone. They form a syndicate each time it is optimal to do so. At the opposite, very experienced venture capitalists suer from potential competition and are more reluctant to syndicate. Therefore they need to choose more experienced partners or to forgo syndication. Third, syndication aects the venture capitalist's eort decision, to improve the project expected protability. Moderately experienced venture capitalists do not exert enough eort, because of the cost of potential competition. At the opposite, very experienced venture capitalists exert too much eort, because of the same cost. The intuition of this result is the following. Potential competition prevents venture capitalists from gathering enough information. Consequently, moderately experienced venture capitalists who would like to, but cannot syndicate, remain too pessimistic about the project's success, and do not exert eort. At the opposite, very experienced venture capitalists remain too optimistic about the project's success and exert too much eort. Last, syndication can also be costly for inexperienced venture capitalists if the eort decision is not observable. Syndication entails leaving part of the rm's equity to the syndicate partner, which weakens the venture capitalist's incentives to exert eort. We nd that since syndication is more likely for inexperienced venture capitalists, they are more likely to bear this additional cost of syndication.
The original contributions of the paper are rst to propose a model where syndication arises endogenously. Syndication is not the unique way to achieve coordination, though. For instance, contractual arrangements involving transfers between venture capitalists are equally valid in our setting. We view these transfers as less likely, since venture capital investments are typically governed by restrictive fund covenants. 3 It is plausible that setting transfers from one fund to another generates additional costs to circumvent the funds investment restrictions. We suggest that syndication, because it avoids direct transfers between venture capitalists, can mitigate these problems and allow information gathering. Second, we highlight the importance of experience on the formation and eciency of syndicates, and on the ex-post involvement of venture capitalists. To our knowledge, no other theoretical paper considers this dimension. 4 This enables us to propose a number of empirical predictions and possible tests. First, the model predicts that the level of experience should be a major determinant of the syndication decision. In particular, standalone investments should be performed by highly experienced venture capitalists. Two eects combine to sustain this result: rst, as was already recognized in the literature, more experienced venture capitalists generate better signals (see Lerner (1994) ). Second, syndication is more costly the higher the level of experience of venture capitalists: because they have more accurate appraisals, experienced venture capitalists have more to lose when disclosing a deal. This prediction is supported by the observations of Hopp and Rieder (2006) that more experienced German venture capitalists syndicate much less than inexperienced ones. Also, a natural consequence of this result is that more syndication should arise in countries where the venture capital industry is young and rather inexperienced. 5 A second prediction of the model is that the uncertainty of the portfolio rm, or of the industry in which venture capitalists invest, should also call for more syndication. This is consistent with the analyses of Bygrave (1987) , and Chiplin and Wright (1997) , who document that syndication is positively related to the level of uncertainty, and of Brander et al. (2002) who measure that standalone investments have less variability than syndicated ones. Another implication of this result is that more drastic innovations should induce more syndication: Hopp and Rieder (2006) do nd that syndication is less frequent for more mature industries. Whether this result holds at the rm level is still an empirical issue. To test more precisely the predictions of our model, one could identify the product-market strategies of the portfolio rms, and dene dierent degrees of innovativeness, in the spirit of Hellmann and Puri (2000) . Third, our model relates the syndication decision to the involvement of venture capitalists. The predictions are two-fold: rst, because inexperienced venture capitalists syndicate more, and because the expected returns are not very high, they do not exert enough eort. Second, experienced venture capitalists who invest alone provide more, but sometimes too much, eort. This last point is supported by Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir (1996) who nd a positive relationship between experience and involvement. It is also in line with Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) who nd a positive relationship between value-added activities and the equity stake of venture capitalists, and a negative relationship between the size of syndicates and value-added activities. Last, our results also address the issue of the relative protability of standalone and syndicated investments. The empirical evidence is mixed: Brander et al. (2002) nd that syndicated investments exhibit higher returns and higher volatility that stand-alone investments. Using dierent performance measures, Hege, Palomino and Schwienbacher (2006) nd no signicant relationship between the size of the syndicate and the level of excess returns. In our model, the relation between syndication and returns depends on the level of experience of venture capitalists: the important point is that, in contrast to alternative learning models, syndicated investments can exhibit higher expected returns than standalone investments. A possible test would be to include the level of experience of syndicate members, when testing the relation between returns and syndication.
In our model, syndication does not result from nancial constraints or diversication motives but from the need to gather information while preventing competition. It is important to discuss to what extent our predictions are dierent, and are able to explain dierent empirical observations, from these competing rationales for syndication. An implication of the resource constraint motive is that syndication increases with the size of deals, and decreases with the size of venture capital funds. An implication of our model is that syndication increases with the level of uncertainty, but is not aected by deal size, or venture capital fund size. This could lead to opposite predictions if one considers that early-stage investments are typically more uncertain, but require less nancial investments than late-stage rounds. Our model predicts more syndication for early-stage rounds, while the resource constraint motive suggests more syndication at later stages. There is not but limited evidence on this. If any, anecdotal evidence on UK investments suggests that the size of syndicates is smaller at later stages, while amounts invested are larger (Wright and Lockett (2003) ). Another reason usually put forward to explain syndication is risk diversication. It is not easy to derive predictions from the risk mitigation motive though. From a theoretical point of view, it is not clear why VCs should care about diversication at the fund level, and why syndication should be the tool to mitigate risk. 6 Some empirical evidence by Hopp and Rieder (2006) nd that the concentration of VC portfolios increases with syndication. If any, this suggests that syndication is not used to hold a diversied portfolio of rms in dierent lines of business. While we believe that the risk mitigation and resource constraints denitely bear some relevance, it seems unlikely that they are the only determinant of the decision to syndicate.
Our paper is closely related to a few papers that explicitly focus on the syndication decision of nancial intermediaries. Admati and Peiderer (1994) is probably the rst paper where syndication emerges as the optimal arrangement. However they focus on sequential syndication, 6 The limited partners who invest in venture capital funds are institutional investors who only invest a small portion of their endowments in the venture capital sector, and who can invest in several VC funds. In addition, if the VC rms themselves want to mitigate risk, they can achieve this through the management of several funds.
whereby an initial venture capitalist remains in the rm to solve a lemon problem with future investors, while we focus on the formation of simultaneous syndicates. Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) provide a theory of syndicates in the investment banking industry. Their approach diers in the sense that they view syndication as a way to solve a moral hazard in team problem (see also Bubna (2002) ), while we view syndication as a way to prevent competition. More recently, Bachman and Schindele (2006) and Cestone, Lerner and White (2006) both analyze models to explain the formation of syndicates: in Bachman and Schindele (2006) , syndication can be a way to deter theft of idea by increasing the reputation loss of each syndicate member. Cestone, Lerner and White (2006) also analyze the syndication decision of a venture capitalist, and study how an optimally designed contractual arrangement of syndicates, can induce information revelation of the syndicate members. In their model, the cost of syndication raises from the adverse selection costs to induce truthfull information revelation, while in our model it raises from the disclosure of a protable deal to a potential competitor. Their results share our view that the cost of syndication increases with the level of experience of venture capitalists, but they dier in the sense that, in their model, the initial venture capitalist does not always gain by choosing the most experienced partner. Another dierence is that we explicitly consider the link between the screening process and the value-added eorts of venture capitalists, while the value-added dimension is absent in Cestone, Lerner, and White (2006) . This paper belongs naturally to the broader literature on venture capital. An important dierence is that while most of the research activity has focused on the post-investment role of venture capitalists, 7 and studied the nancial contracts between venture capitalists and investors, 8 we emphasize the pre-investment selection process of venture capitalists and focus on their syndication decision. This pre-investment selection process has not been much analyzed in the venture capital context. Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) study empirically the contents of venture capitalists' investment analysis, and their relation to the type of contracts and ex-post involvement of venture capitalists. Garmaise (2006) considers a model where venture capitalists have superior expertise in project evaluation compared to other agents. He however concentrates on the nancial contract between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist, while we focus on the contractual arrangement between venture capitalists, and study the formation of syndicates. Brander et al. (2002) also investigate the selection and value-added activities of venture capitalists, but they do not endogenize the syndication decision. Last, our paper is also related to Biais and Perotti (2003) who study the formation of a partnership by experts with dierent pieces of information. They share our assumption that revealing the existence of an investment project to 7 See Admati and Peiderer (1994) , Bergemann and Hege (1998) , Cornelli and Yosha (2003) , and Dessì (2005) for a theoretical analysis of sequential investment and the optimal continuation decision, Schmidt (2003) , Renucci (2001) , Repullo and Suarez (1999), or Casamatta (2003) on the advising role of venture capitalists, and Chan, Siegel and Thakor (1990) , Hellmann (1998) another expert can be costly. In a context of private information, they highlight the importance of the complementarity between the evaluations of the dierent experts to mitigate the risk of idea-stealing. In our model, evaluations are not complementary in the sense that the project can be valuable without their joint realization and syndication deters potential competition.
Last, our emphasis on the importance of information aggregation for nancial decisions relates to the research eld on the role of experts and certication in economics and nance. In some of that literature, experts are viewed as intermediaries who transmit information from informed to uninformed parties, and researchers have focused on the various incentives of each party (see Lizzeri (1999) on the incentives of intermediaries to manipulate information, FaureGrimaud, Peyrache and Quesada (2006) on the incentives of (informed) rms to eectively use that information, or Morrison and White (2006) on the externalities created by screening, in a model of bank regulation). Another branch of the literature emphasizes the incentive problems between a principal and experts (see Gromb and Martimort (2004) on the use of multiple experts to save on agency costs, Gerardi, MacLean, and Postlewaite (2005) on the optimal arrangement to aggregate information, and Baron and Besanko (1999) on the formation of informational alliance among experts). While all of that literature emphasizes information revelation problems, and focuses on the transmission of information to uninformed principals, we consider venture capitalists as principals, and do not study issues of information revelation.
The organization of the paper is the following. The next section presents the model and assumptions. Section 3 derives the socially optimal aggregation of information and investment decisions. Section 4 introduces the cost of potential competition between venture capitalists and provides a rationale for syndication. Section 5 analyses the syndication decision and the screening process when the initial venture capitalist is under the threat of potential competition. Section 6 introduces another cost of syndication when eort is not observable. Section 7 derives empirical predictions and proposes new tests. The last section concludes. Proofs are provided in the appendix, except those directly derived from the text.
The model
We consider the situation faced by a risk-neutral, cash-poor entrepreneur who needs an initial outlay I to start an innovative investment project. The project yields a veriable risky outcome R. For simplicity, we assume that the project can either succeed or fail, hence R can take two values: R > 0 in case of success and 0 in case of failure. The probability of success depends on the quality of the project. If the project is good, the probability of success is p h (thus 1 − p h is the probability of failure of a good project), while if the project is bad, the probability of success is p l < p h . 9 We assume that only good projects are protable. With risk-neutral agents, and a riskless interest rate normalized to zero, this implies that:
Since we are concerned with a new, innovative project, the true quality of the project is initially unknown. Denote q 0 the a priori probability that the quality of the project is good. This prior is common knowledge.
The entrepreneur must raise funds from outside investors. Some of those investors have specic expertise in nancing innovative projects. We call them venture capitalists (hereafter VC) and assume they have the following characteristics. First, VCs have the ability to better identify the true quality of the projects they are proposed, while traditional, non-specialized investors cannot. 10 This assumption reects the fact that VCs concentrate their investments in specic lines of business and can use their expertise to infer the quality of new projects. Consequently, we assume that venture capitalists can complete an investment analysis, to obtain a signal related to the project true quality. For simplicity, we assume that generating this signal is costless. 11 This signal can be either good (s = H) or bad (s = L) and is all the more precise that the venture capitalist's expertise is high. In other words, all venture capitalists have the ability to screen projects, but they have dierent levels of observable ability. This assumption captures the idea that although specialized in the same line of business, some venture capitalists may be more experienced than others. Formally, the signal s i received by a venture capitalist with expertise α i has the following properties:
where α i ∈ [ 1 2 ; 1]. The probability of receiving a good signal conditional on a project being good increases with the venture capitalist's expertise. After observing a signal, the venture capitalist updates his belief on the project's quality using Bayes' rule.
Second, VCs can also use their expertise to provide business advice once the project has been funded. 12 Correspondingly, we assume that VCs can exert a costly contractible eort 13 that 9 In the remaining of the paper, we will indierently refer to a good project, or to a project with success probability p h to denote a project of good quality.
10 See Sahlman (1988 Sahlman ( , 1990 for instance. 11 In standard models of sequential competition, such xed costs could in principle constitute barriers to entry, and play a strategic role (see Bain (1956) ). This is not the case in our model, since the second VC's entry depends exclusively on the rst VC's willingness to let him entry. Therefore, introducing a xed cost to generate the signal does not qualitatively modify the results, but heavily burdens the presentation of the model. 12 See Gompers and Lerner (1999) or Hellmann and Puri (2002) . 13 In a rst step, we leave aside incentive issues, and focus on the interaction between the perceived project quality, the investment, and the eort decision. The assumption of contractible eort is relaxed in section 6. increases the probability of success of the project, if the true quality is good. To keep things simple, there are only two possible levels of eort. If the VC exerts eort (decision e), he incurs a private cost c > 0 and increases the probability of success of a good project by > 0 (the probability of success of a bad project remains unchanged). If the VC does not exert eort (decision e), the probability of success remains unchanged. The assumption that eort aects only good projects is motivated by the fact that the returns to "living dead" projects are typically very low (close to zero), whatever the eort of the VCs. Bad projects in our model refer to those types of projects. 14 Another important assumption is that only one agent needs to exert eort. 15 This is in line with casual observation about the role of the lead venture capital investor in a VC syndicate. As pointed by Wright and Lockett (2003) page 2085, "the degree of contact between the members of the syndicate and the investee is anticipated to dier according to their role. Absent this asymmetry of contact, there would be a considerable degree of duplication of eort between the lead and non-lead rms". Using survey data on the UK VC industry, Wright and Lockett (2003) nd that lead VCs are more hands-on in monitoring, more likely to have frequent contacts with investees, and that they have more access to management-based information. We follow the features of the industry by assuming that only one eort is needed. 16 The net present value of the project depends on the agents' beliefs, the project's quality, and the eort decision. Denote q s i the updated belief after a signal s i is generated and q s i ,s j the updated belief after two signals s i and s j . For instance, after one signal, the NPV is written:
if the eort is exerted, and:
if the VC does not exert eort. Consistent with the fact that very innovative projects, while potentially highly protable, also have a highly uncertain quality, the a priori NPV of the project is negative, whatever the eort decision. Therefore, the entrepreneur needs to rely on VC nancing to implement his project.
14 An important question is to what extent our results depend on this specication. The current specication allows us to obtain investment regimes in which it is optimal to invest and not to exert eort. Such regimes also occur if we take a multiplicative and symmetric eort term, where the probability of success p is multiplied by (1 + ) for all types of projects. But they will disappear for instance with an additive and symmetric value-adding term. In that case, eort is always exerted when investment takes place, as long as R − c > 0. This specication generates a perfect correlation between the investment and the eort decision, and prevents us from studying the intensity of the eort exerted, according to the perceived quality of the project. 15 We thus abstract from moral hazard in team problems. 16 Note however that this needs not be the case for other types of syndicates. See for instance Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) for an analysis of moral hazard in team in the investment banking industry.
The timing of the game is the following. The entrepreneur proposes an investment opportunity to a rst VC (labelled VC 1 ), who generates a signal s 1 . Then, VC 1 can:
• either reject the project,
• or stop collecting information and invest immediately,
• or call for a second evaluation performed by a second VC, labelled VC 2 .
In the latter case, we assume that the signals are freely observed by the two VCs. 17 Last, if (and after) the project is implemented, VC 1 takes the eort decision. 18 3 Optimal information aggregation and investment decision
In this section, we determine VC 1 's optimal information gathering and investment policy. We assume that VC 1 is able to capture all the project surplus, so that he maximizes the project's NPV. 19 VC 1 asks for a second evaluation each time it increases the project's expected NPV, compared to the current NPV. This implies that at least one realization of the second signal must modify the initial investment decision. If not, the expected value of the project given s 2 is equal to the value of the project given s 1 . Formally, s 2 is generated if and only if:
To keep the analysis as rich as possible, we want to ensure that it is sometimes optimal to invest, but not to exert eort. It must be the case that for some α 1 , N P V ( e, q s 1 )> N P V (e, q s 1 ) > 0. Otherwise, the decision to invest would immediately trigger eort. Intuitively, this is the case if the eort is not very ecient, which is formally stated in the next assumption.
Assumption 1 Eort is not very ecient:
17 See Biais and Perotti (2003) or Cestone, White and Lerner (2006) on the issue of privately observed signals. 18 Alternatively, the eort could be decided by VC2: the identity of the lead VC investor does not modify the results. 19 The model can easily be extended to the case where the entrepreneur has a xed fraction of surplus. Also, this assumption can be an equilibrium outcome in specic bilateral negotiation games -see Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2006) . Figure 1 represents the optimal information aggregation and investment decision of VC 1 , according to his, as well as the other VC's, level of experience. The x axis measures the level of experience of VC 1 , while the y axis measures the level of experience of VC 2 . 20 This gure describes the choice made by VC 1 for any couple {α 1 ; α 2 }. 21 The gure restricts to the case where VC 1 has received a good signal. In the dotted lines regions, VC 1 does not collect the second signal, and makes his investment decision alone. In the plain regions, he collects the second signal : investment and eort decisions are specied according to the realization of the second signal.
When α 1 is below a threshold α I , in the lower left side of the picture, VC 1 prefers not to invest alone even after a good signal. He then needs a second evaluation to conrm his own appraisal. Note that the more condent VC 1 is about his own evaluation, the less precise the second evaluation has to be to conrm his signal. Consequently, one observes that the minimum level of VC 2 's experience to collect s 2 decreases with VC 1 's experience: it is represented by the decreasing curve ϕ I, e (α 1 ).
When VC 1 is more experienced (above α I ), in the lower right side of the picture, he invests if he obtains a good signal. A second piece of information can be useful to deter investment. In that case, the more experienced VC 1 is, the higher must be the experience of VC 2 to make him change his mind: this eect is represented by the increasing curve ϕ I, e (α 1 ).
The second piece of information can also be used to modify the eort decision. For instance, if VC 1 is moderately experienced and obtains a good signal (i.e. if α 1 ∈ [α I , α e ]), he prefers to invest and not to exert eort unless he receives a second good signal. The experience of VC 2 required to exert eort decreases then with VC 1 's own experience (see the curve ϕ e (α 1 )). The opposite arises when VC 1 is very experienced and is discouraged to exert eort after bad news from VC 2 (see the curve ϕ e (α 1 )).
The above discussion is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 The minimum level of experience of VC 2 increases (decreases) with VC 1 's own experience when they disagree (agree) on the investment or eort decision. 20 A detailed explanation for the determination of the dierent functions and variables is provided in the appendix. 21 We have not considered the optimal choice of VC 2 's experience. This is because in our setting, the optimal value of α2 is trivially 1. We implicitly assume that choosing exactly the level of experience of VC2 might be impossible or dicult. The venture capital industry may be more or less well developed, which restrains the set of available levels of VC experience. Even when experienced VCs exist in the economy, time constraints may prevent a given VC to actually process an investment candidate, which reduces again the set of available syndicate partners. A way to model this would be to introduce a matching technology that randomly draws the level of experience α 2 available to VC 1 when he wants to syndicate.
. Note that these results rely on the dynamics of q induced by bayesian updating. In particular, they do not rely on our specic binary investment model. To assess this, we present in appendix page 28 a continuous investment version of our generic model and state that the results of proposition 1 are qualitatively unchanged.
Potential competition between venture capitalists
The previous paragraph determined the information aggregation and investment decision when VC 1 is able to capture the project's NPV. We now introduce the possibility that VC 2 proposes a competing oer to the entrepreneur, if he is contacted by VC 1 . Asking for a second piece of information becomes costly for VC 1 : disclosing the investment opportunity to the second VC destroys his monopoly position. 22 To determine the optimal information aggregation strategy of VC 1 , we rst need to determine what pay-os can be obtained by each party if VC 2 is contacted.
The outcome of potential competition
The timing of the game is modied as follows: if VC 1 discloses the project to a second VC, we assume that both VCs observe freely the two signals s 1 and s 2 generated by their analyses. After information is observed, they can either make competing (separate) oers, or negotiate and make a joint oer. This timing implicitly assumes that competing oers cannot be ruled out, i.e. that VC 1 cannot write a non competing agreement with VC 2 . This assumption can be justied by the fact that i) since VC 1 has not invested into the project yet, he cannot claim to have property rights over the project, that could rule out competing oers; ii) forcing the second VC to sign a non-competing clause goes against all competition enhancing policies. We will come back to this point when discussing the possible contractual arrangements between VCs.
To solve the model, we now describe the outcome of the game if VCs do make competing oers. Oers are simultaneous. If the project's NPV (conditional on the signals) is negative, neither VC 1 nor VC 2 will propose to nance the entrepreneur's project. If the project's NPV is positive, each VC separately proposes a nancial agreement to the entrepreneur, specifying the share of nancial income (denoted δ i , i ∈ {1, 2}) that they require in exchange for the initial investment I. Since the two VCs have the same evaluation, the game thus boils down to standard Bertrand competition. At equilibrium, we thus have δ 1 = δ 2 , and each VC earns zero prot in expectation.
Alternatively, the two VCs can negotiate for a joint oer 23 to share the project's NPV. We make the assumption that such a joint oer does not modify the entrepreneur's bargaining power. 24 As is standard in this type of setting, the bargaining between the two VCs leads to the Nash solution: when the VCs have the same bargaining power, they split evenly the surplus from negotiation. 25 If negotiation fails, as stated above, the two VCs engage in Bertrand competition and obtain zero prots. Their reservation utility in the bargaining process is thus equal to zero, strategies by VC1, as in Spence (1977) or Dixit (1979) . This is also why introducing costly signals will not involve strategic, barrier-to-entry eects in the model. 23 This assumption departs from Garmaise (2006) who focuses on competition between VCs, in an asymmetric information setting. 24 If the entrepreneur's bargaining power increases with the number of investors, that will creates an additional cost of syndication, and reinforce our result that syndication is costly, especially for the most experienced VCs. For simplicity, we choose not to include this cost in the analysis. Note also that our assumption is consistent with the way we view syndication: the entrepreneur bargains with a syndicate, and not with two (separate) investors. From the entrepreneur's point of view, there is thus no dierence between bargaining with a single investor and with a syndicate. 25 Relaxing the assumption of equal bargaining power, by allowing for instance the bargaining power of each party to increase with his relative level of experience, does not modify qualitatively the results.
and the surplus from negotiation is equal to the project's NPV. Each VC thus obtains half of the project's NPV from negotiating.
The cost of gathering information incurred by VC 1 appears now clearly. If he sticks to his own evaluation, he enjoys a monopoly position, and captures the whole project's NPV. If however he calls for a second evaluation, because of the threat of competition, he cannot capture more than half of the project's NPV. Intuitively, there will be cases where the second signal is valuable (i.e. it increases the NPV), but VC 1 loses too much to be willing to gather information. VC 1 's incentives to gather information will be analyzed more formally in section 5.
The contractual arrangement between VCs
We now investigate which contracts can implement the Nash bargaining solution. The contractual elements can be contingent on the following veriable variables: the amount invested, the investment decision and the nal income generated by the project. We thus exclude signals from being part of the contract. Indeed, although signals are observable by the two VCs, it is very unlikely that they can be veriable by an outside court. Last, contracts are signed after signals are observed.
A contract determines i) VC i 's contribution to the total initial outlay I, denoted C i (I), with i C i (I) = I ii) VC i 's return according to the nal income R i (R) 26 and iii) transfers between VCs at the investment date, denoted
implements the Nash-bargaining solution. Examples of possible contracts are:
Ex. 1:
Ex. 2:
Example 1 is a contract whereby VC 1 buys to VC 2 the right to be the sole investor in the project: the initial transfer compensates VC 2 accordingly. Example 2 is a contract involving no initial transfer. Note that all contracts in the form of Example 2 involve co-ownership of the rm by the two VCs. Indeed, even if one VC's contribution is nul (C i = 0), he receives a strictly positive share of equity (R i (R) > 0). In the remainder of the analysis, such contracts involving no initial transfers will be denoted syndicated investments.
In principle, all types of contracts are equally valid. We view contracts with transfers as less likely, since venture capital investments are typically governed by restrictive fund covenants. 27 It is plausible that setting transfers from one fund to another generates additional costs to circumvent the funds investment restrictions. For these reasons, we argue that syndicated investments, where the two VCs are co-owners of the rm, are the most frequent contractual arrangements to implement the Nash-bargaining solution.
The contracts derived above are decided upon after observing signals, which seems more in line with practice. It is important though to discuss what would happen if contracts could be signed before disclosing the project to the second VC, in the spirit of the ex-ante contracts considered in Anton and Yao (1994) . 28 Clearly, the investment contract proposed by VC 1 to VC 2 before disclosing the project is plagued by asymmetric information, because VC 2 does not know VC 1 's signal yet. Separating contracts would typically entail that VC 1 keeps a higher fraction of returns, and invests a higher fraction of investment to credibly signal his good evaluation. 29 But, our model is dierent in that VC 1 does not need to sell his project to VC 2 , but only needs a second piece of information. Avoiding to trade with VC 2 allows him to save on adverse selection costs. The (rather trivial) optimal contract is simply for VC 1 to propose to invest alone and to get all the proceeds from the investment, whatever his signal. This is exactly the non competing contract that we ruled out previously. One reason for ruling it out (on top of such contracts being illegal in practice) is that it might not be robust to collusion with a third VC. Even if VC 2 commits not to invest in the project after observing the two signals, it should be hard to prevent him from making a competing oer through another fund. Another reason for not considering such contracts would be to consider that the second signal is not publicly observed. In that case, VC 1 would need to oer an incentive compatible contract to make VC 2 reveal his information: this would give rise to informational rents, and the ex-ante contract described above would not be optimal. 30 The cost of information revelation is studied in other models of information gathering (Biais and Perotti (2003) , Cestone, Lerner and White (2006) ), and we focus here on the cost of potential competition. 27 See Gompers and Lerner (1996) for an analysis of such covenants. 28 In theory, one could also conceive to sign contracts even before the rst VC receives his signal, specifying what would be the investment contract if VC1 contacts VC2: considering contracts signed after the rst signal amounts for VC 1 to select his preferred contract in the class of ex-ante contracts.
29 A similar feature arises in Anton and Yao (1994) who show that such ex-ante contracts are possible if the seller (VC 1 ) does not have limited liability, and can signal the quality of his project by guaranteeing possible future losses of the buyer. 30 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
5 The decision to syndicate
In this section, we investigate when syndication actually takes place and compare the syndication decision to the ecient information aggregation derived in section 3. The trade-o faced by VC 1 is now the following. He can rely on his own evaluation and enjoy a monopoly position. Alternatively, he can call for a second evaluation that yields more precise information on the project's true quality. In that case, VC 1 gives up half of the monopoly prots to avoid competition as stated in section 4. Formally, VC 1 chooses to syndicate if and only if:
We then compare this syndication decision to the optimal information gathering strategy (from section 3).
Proposition 2 If VC 1 is rather inexperienced (in the sense that α 1 ≤ α I ) or if VC 1 has received a bad signal, syndication occurs whenever information gathering is optimal. The threshold α I is dened in the appendix page 27.
Proposition 2 means that potential competition has no incidence on inexperienced (or pessimistic) VCs. The intuition is the following: inexperienced VCs are not able to screen eciently the projects under evaluation. Therefore they have nothing to lose when contacting a second evaluator (their monopoly prots are equal to zero). Since syndication is costless, it takes place each time the second piece of information is valuable, and the project is protable. The same is true if VC 1 receives a bad signal: it is not protable to invest alone, and VC 1 contacts VC 2 anytime his information is valuable, as dened in section 3. Both the realization of the signal and the experience of the venture capitalist determine the extent to which he is hurt by potential competition.
Proposition 3 Potential competition between VCs aects the screening process in the following way:
• an experienced VC 1 , in the sense that α 1 ∈ [α I , α e ], demands a higher than optimal level of VC 2 's experience to form a syndicate.
• A very experienced VC 1 , in the sense that α 1 > α e , never forms a syndicate and forgoes gathering information.
The threshold α e is dened in the appendix page 27.
When VC 1 is rather experienced, his evaluation is precise enough to nd it protable to invest alone. As a consequence, syndication is costly because VC 1 has to give up positive monopoly prots. To compensate this loss, he requires a more precise signal s 2 (compared to the rst best), hence a more experienced partner. Since the monopoly prots of VC 1 increase with his level of experience, he is more and more reluctant to syndicate (or, he requires more and more experienced partners): this may reach the point at which no level of VC 2 's experience satises VC 1 's requirement. In those cases, the cost of potential competition is too large compared to the benets of more precise information. This does not happen in the rst best since, unless VC 1 has perfect information, there always exists a degree of precision such that the second piece of information is valuable.
Corollary 1 Potential competition leads to overinvestment when VC 1 is suciently experienced (in the sense that α 1 > α I ).
The intuition of corollary 1 is the following. When VC 1 is suciently experienced so that he can invest alone after a good signal, the evaluation made by a second VC is valuable to discourage investment in case of a bad signal s 2 . Because of potential competition, VC 1 does not gather information each time it is optimal to do so, and invests too much.
Corollary 2 Potential competition leads to overprovision (resp. underprovision) of eort when VC 1 's experience is greater (resp. smaller) than α e .
When VC 1 is the sole investor, he exerts the optimal level of eort given his own information. When he is very experienced (i.e. when α i ≥ α e , he always exerts eort if his signal is good, while a bad signal s 2 could be used to discourage eort (if α 2 > ϕ e (α 1 ), as depicted on gure 1). At the opposite, when VC 1 is moderately experienced (i.e. when α i ∈ [α I , α e ], he never exerts eort if his signal is good, while a good signal s 2 would encourage eort (if α 2 > ϕ e (α 1 )). When potential competition deprives VC 1 of the second evaluation, he exerts too much eort in those cases where the second signal would have discouraged eort, and where VC 1 prefers not to contact VC 2 . Similarly, he exerts too little eort in those cases where the second signal would have encouraged eort, and where VC 1 does not contact a second evaluator.
The results stated in propositions 2 and 3 and in corollaries 1 and 2 are illustrated in gure 2 (for the case where s 1 = H). As before, the dotted line regions represent the zones where VC 1 does not contact a second venture capitalist after receiving a good signal. The plain (white) regions represent the zones where VC 1 contacts VC 2 , and forms a syndicate when investment takes place. Each region species the optimal investment and eort decisions according to the signals and the levels of experience. It is useful to compare gure 2 and gure 1 to understand how potential competition alters the aggregation of information, as well as the investment decisions. First, inexperienced VCs are not aected by the cost of potential competition: when α 1 < α I , both gures coincide, and the threshold above which VC 1 calls for a second expertise remains the same (ϕ I, e (α 1 )). This illustrates the result of proposition 2: there is no cost to syndicate for inexperienced VCs since they have nothing to lose. Second, the information gathering region shrinks when the experience of VC 1 grows. For instance, when α 1 ∈ [α I , α e ], gure 1 teaches us that VC 1 should contact VC 2 whenever α 2 ≥ ϕ I, e (α 1 ) and refrain from investing if the second signal is bad. From gure 2 one can see that VC 1 contacts VC 2 to refrain from investing if α 2 ≥ ϕ s, I, e (α 1 ) > ϕ I, e (α 1 ). This is the cost of potential competition highlighted in proposition 3: competition prevents VC 1 from collecting a second evaluation each time he should. Third, the cost of syndication increases with VC 1 's experience and can nally deter information gathering. This eect is easily seen in the case where VC 1 is very experienced (α 1 > α e ). The information gathering zone (when α 2 > ϕ e (α 1 )) has disappeared from gure 2. Last, observe that one region, that was dened by α 2 ∈ [max[ϕ e (α 1 ), ϕ e (α 1 )], ϕ I, e (α 1 )] completely disappears: this is the region where the second signal is used to modify the eort, but not the investment decision. As a consequence, a moderately experienced VC 1 exerts too little eort and a very experienced VC 1 exerts too much eort as stated in corollary 2.
Syndication and unobservable eort
In the previous sections, we assumed that the eort decision was contractible to abstract from moral hazard issues. We now relax this assumption and assume that the eort exerted by VC 1 is unobservable and cannot be contracted upon. In our simple setting, if VC 1 remains the sole investor, moral hazard is irrelevant: VC 1 is the only owner of the rm, he reaps the full benet of eort, and is always induced to exert eort whenever it is optimal to do so (conditional on his information).
If VC 1 decides to form a syndicate, his eort decision might be altered because he has to concede a fraction 1 − γ of equity to VC 2 . 31 VC 1 still bears the full cost of his eort, but recoups only a fraction of the benet, which can weaken his incentives to exert eort. Dene γ max (< 1) the maximal share of equity that VC 1 can keep with a syndication contract; γ max corresponds to the case where β = 1, and is dened by (in the case where eort is protable):
Also, the incentive compatibility condition ensuring that VC 1 prefers to exert eort given his stake in the rm γ is written:
Therefore, VC 1 syndicates and exerts eort if γ ∈ [ c q R , γ max ]. As long as this interval exists, moral hazard has no bite because it is always possible to set γ such that VC 1 exerts the optimal eort level. In the case where the interval does not exist, it is not possible to induce VC 1 to exert eort although it would be optimal to do so. In that case, syndication between VCs leads to underprovision of eort.
When is syndication likely to deter eort ? As illustrated in gure 2, if VC 1 syndicates, it is optimal to exert eort when α 2 > ϕ e (α 1 ). This means that along the curve representing ϕ e (α 1 ), c q R = 1, and VC 1 exerts eort if and only if he owns 100% of the rm's equity. Clearly, for α 2 slightly above ϕ e (α 1 ), VC 1 forms a syndicate to invest, and has too small a stake in the rm to be induced to exert eort: the interval [ c q R , γ max ] does not exist. It follows from the previous discussion that there exists a region above ϕ e (α 1 ) where it is optimal to exert eort, but where it is not possible to induce VC 1 to do so. This gives the following proposition which is graphically illustrated with a numerical example in the appendix page 33. 31 Note that in our setting, equity is an optimal contract to induce one agent to exert eort. This is because the nal income can only be R or 0: it is not possible to distinguish between debt, equity, or any other nancial contract.
Proposition 4 Moral hazard leads to underprovision of eort under syndication, i.e. when VC 1 is not very experienced.
The previous section points out one cost of potential competition, which is the insucient aggregation of information and inecient screening process. Because they have more to lose when forming a syndicate, experienced VCs essentially bear this cost. Inexperienced VCs are immune from the threat of potential competition and can aggregate through syndication all valuable information. This section highlights another cost of syndication that is borne primarily by inexperienced VCs. When eort is not observable, there is a tension between the need to give up a fraction of the rm's equity to form a syndicate and the need to keep enough shares to be induced to work. We show that this tension leads to underprovision of eort. Note that moral hazard aects the regions where syndication takes place. Intuitively, since there is less syndication for more experienced VCs, this cost decreases with VC 1 's experience.
Empirical predictions and possible tests
This model allows to derive a number of empirical predictions concerning the formation of syndicates (who syndicates with whom, and for which projects), the post-investment involvement of the syndicate partners, as well as the protability of syndicated investments. We present below the main predictions of our model, and try to assess their empirical relevance compared to alternative explanations of syndication. Finally, we suggest possible empirical tests to t more accurately our predictions.
The empirical predictions of our model
• A central prediction of our model is that the level of experience of venture capitalists should be a major determinant of their decision to syndicate. In particular, standalone investments should be performed by highly experienced VCs. In our model this happens for two reasons. The rst one is rather obvious: more experienced VCs are able to screen more eciently projects, and circumvent more accurately the project risk. Therefore, there is less need for syndication. The second one is directly linked to the cost of disclosing deals to potential competitors: because they have more accurate evaluations, experienced VCs are more vulnerable to potential competition. In other words, experienced VCs have more to lose when disclosing a deal. Having a higher cost and a lower benet of forming a syndicate, they syndicate less. While the rst argument was already recognized in the literature (Lerner (1994) ), the second is specic to our paper. We believe that the second argument is important, in particular for early stage investments, where uncertainty is so high that even experienced VCs could benet from the assessment of a peer. According to our analysis, what refrains them from syndicating is the cost of losing monopoly rents. This prediction is supported by various empirical ndings: studying a sample of biotech investments, Lerner (1994) nds that experienced VCs syndicate with similarly experienced VCs. In addition, Hopp and Rieder (2006) document from a sample of German venture capital investments that more experienced VCs syndicate much less than their inexperienced counterparts. For instance, VC rms which have undertaken more deals syndicate less, as well as those which have undertaken a larger proportion of their deals in Germany.
• Our results also imply that, other things equal, the uncertainty of the portfolio rms, or of the industry where VCs invest in, should have an inuence on the level of syndication of venture capitalists. Indeed the venture capitalists' ability to generate precise signals on the projects' quality (α i in the model) also depends on the general level of uncertainty of those projects. Presumably, the venture capital industry ability to screen projects, should be lower the younger the rm, or the more innovative the rm's business. For those projects or industries, it is unlikely that VCs with very high α i exist. As a consequence, one should observe more syndication for those industries. This is supported by evidence both at the rm, and at the industry level. Dierent papers have reported that syndication is positively related to the level of uncertainty of projects (Bygrave (1987) , Chiplin and Wright (1997) , Amit, Brander, and Antweiler (2002)), or to the age of the funded rms, early stage rms exhibiting more syndication (Hopp and Rieder (2006) ). Some papers have also reported that the industry itself is an important determinant of syndication. Hopp and Rieder (2006) nd that more mature industries, like industrial products and services, exhibit much lower levels of syndication that the biotech or internet sectors (see also Lehman and Boschker (2006) ). To the extent that projects in mature industries are more easily readable (say, because comparisons are easier, valuations based on ratio comparisons more accurate), the precision of VCs signals is likely to be higher than in more innovative sectors.
• An original feature of our analysis is to study jointly two sources of value-added of venture capitalists, which are usually investigated separately in the literature, namely their ability to screen projects, and their ability to provide value-enhancing advice. Our predictions are twofold. First, because inexperienced VCs syndicate, they do not exert enough eort. This is because syndicate members have to share the returns from the project, which can discourage the lead VC's eort. Note however that syndication does not necessarily imply underprovision of eort: When expected returns are quite high, it is possible to conceive an incentive compatible return sharing scheme. As a consequence, underprovision of eort because of syndication is more likely when (some) syndicate members are inexperienced (i.e. when expected returns are not very high). Second, the model predicts that experienced VCs who invest alone should provide more eort, and sometimes too much eort. Because of their high cost of syndicating deals, experienced VCs may overestimate the quality of projects, which, together with them being the sole investor, induces them to exert too much eort. 32 The fact that very experienced VCs exert more eort is consistent with Sapienza et al. (1996) . This is also in line with Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) who nd i) a positive relationship between value-added activities and the equity stake of venture capitalists, and ii) a negative relationship between the size of syndicates and value-added activities. Last, our results stress the fact that whether syndication triggers more eort than standalone investments depends on the level of experience of VCs: in particular, moderately experienced VCs should exert more eort when they form a syndicate.
• Our model allows to discuss whether standalone investments should exhibit more or less variable returns than syndicated investments. Brander et al. (2002) nd in their sample that standalone investments have less variable returns. The predictions we can derive from the model are less clearcut, but can shed light on the determinants of the variability of returns of VC investments. On the one hand, experienced VCs (who invest alone) have more precise signals: their investments should exhibit less variable returns. On the other hand, experienced VCs who nd it too costly to syndicate accept too many projects: in that case, their standalone investments should exhibit more variable returns. Our analysis states that highly experienced VCs benet from the positive precision-of-signal eect, but suer from relying on their own information only. The investments of less experienced VCs exhibit exactly the opposite features: each piece of information is less precise, but those VCs manage to syndicate, which improves their selection process. Which eect dominates according to the level of experience of VCs is still an empirical issue.
• Last, an important question is whether syndicated projects are more or less protable than standalone projects. The empirical evidence is mixed. Brander et al. (2002) nd a positive relationship between syndication and the return of portfolio rms. But they also nd that syndicated investment have higher volatility than stand-alone investments. Hopp and Rieder (2006) document that syndication has a positive eect on sales growth. However they nd no signicant impact of the number of syndicated members on the sales growth. Using more appropriate performance measures, Hege, Palomino and Schwienbacher (2006) nd no signicant relationship between the size of the syndicate and the level of excess returns. In our model, the relationship between syndication and expected returns depends on the level of experience of VCs. The important point is that syndicated investments can exhibit higher expected returns than standalone investments. 33 This result is to be contrasted to the result of Brander et al. (2002) . They predict lower expected returns for syndicated projects, when syndication is used 32 Overprovision of eort arises in our model from the assumption that the eciency of the VC's eort increases with the quality of the project: it is therefore optimal not to exert eort if it is unlikely that the project is good. Note that with constant eort eciency, experienced VCs who cannot syndicate would invest too much, and also exert too much eort: our predictions would be unchanged, but the current specication allows to disantangle the investment decision from the eort decision. 33 We provide in the appendix page 33 a numerical example to highlight this point.
for a screening motive. We complement their work by showing that this result depends crucially on the level of experience of VCs.
Comparison with alternative motives of syndication Several motives for syndication are traditionally proposed in the literature (although not relying on formal models). One possible reason for syndication is the capital constraint of venture capitalists: some deals may simply be too large to be undertaken by a single VC who might not have enough funds, or might be prevented by his fund's covenants to invest a large amount in a single rm. The argument would imply the following empirical patterns: one should observe that syndication at any given round of investment increases with the size of the deals, and decreases with the size of the venture capital fund. To the extent that early stage rounds involve generally less nancial investment than later stage rounds, the capital constraint hypothesis also implies that there is less syndication at earlier stages, and more syndication at later stages. This prediction is exactly the opposite of what our model suggests: when uncertainty is high (earlier stages) there is a greater need to gather information, and VCs' signals are unlikely to be very precise, which should result in more syndicated deals. Some empirical evidence seems to speak against the capital constraint motive as the only reason for syndication. For instance, Hopp and Rieder (2006) report that syndication is not related to the amount of capital under management: large VC funds do not syndicate less than small counterparts. Also, anecdotal evidence on UK venture capital investments suggests that the size of syndicates is smaller at later stages, while amounts invested are larger (Wright and Lockett (2003) ). It is plausible though that capital constraints play, in some instances, a role in the decision to syndicate. Our model simply suggests an alternative, and possibly complementary rationale for syndication: while early stage syndication may be due to the need to gather information, later stage syndication may simply reect some capital constraints of VC funds. Last, the capital constraint argument is agnostic concerning some of the empirical predictions we suggest. If syndication was only a matter of investment size, it is not obvious why this should aect the level of eort of syndicate members (even if each syndicate member has a lower share of equity, the total project value is higher, and eort should not be aected), or their decision of who to syndicate with.
Another reason usually put forward is the risk diversication motive: VCs syndicate deals to invest in more projects, and to hold a more diversied portfolio. We are not aware of any evidence that directly tests this assumption. From a theoretical point of view though, it is not clear why VCs should care about diversication at the fund level, and why syndication should be the tool to mitigate risk. First, limited partners who invest in VC funds are institutional investors who only invest a small portion of their endowments in the venture capital sector, and who can invest in several VC funds. It is not clear why there is also a need to diversify at the fund level from the investors point of view. In addition, if the VC rms themselves want to mitigate risk, they can achieve this through the management of several funds, each dedicated to a specic line of business, or geographic area. It is thus rather uneasy to derive predictions from the risk mitigation motive. Some empirical evidence by Hopp and Rieder (2006) nd that the concentration of VC portfolios increases with syndication. If any, this suggests that syndication is not used to hold a diversied portfolio of rms in dierent lines of business. While we believe that the risk mitigation motive bears some relevance, it seems unlikely that it is the only determinant of the decision to syndicate. Also, diversication per se cannot explain some usually observed patterns of syndication, in particular the fact that experienced VCs syndicate less, and more likely with their peers.
Last, several models view syndication as an optimal investment arrangement. Building on Lerner (1994) 's idea that syndication can improve the selection process, Brander et al. (2002) propose two alternative models of syndication, relying respectively on information gathering, and on value-added. We use dierent assumptions, which lead to dierent predictions. First, we explicitly consider the level of experience in the syndication decision, while they do not. This allows us to derive predictions linking the level of experience, to the syndication decision, to the ex-post involvement of VCs, and to the characteristics of VC investments in terms of variance and return. We already discussed above to which extent these predictions t some empirical evidence. Second, by construction in their model, syndicated projects exhibit more value-added from VCs than standalone investments (since it is one reason for syndication). We enrich their analysis by considering simultaneously the selection process and eort decision. This allows us to predict that experienced VCs syndicate less and provide more eort. Such a prediction was not possible in their framework. Cestone, Lerner, and White (2006) have more recently proposed a model of syndication to gather signals. Their assumptions dier from ours on several dimensions. They consider privately observed signals, and investigate the incentive costs of syndication, while we focus on observable signals and explore the potential competition costs of syndication. Our predictions partly dier in the sense that highly experienced VCs in their model do not always prefer to syndicate with experienced counterparts, because of the high incentive costs. In our model, if one VC wants to syndicate, he always prefers the most experienced partner available. In addition, our analysis of the provision of eort is absent in their model, so that some of our predictions are irrelevant in their analysis. Finally, Bachman and Schindele (2006) motivate syndication as a commitment device not to steal the entrepreneur's idea : in particular, they derive predictions relating the syndication size to the extent of legal protection of ideas, which are dierent and possibly complementary to ours.
Possible tests of our model Some available empirical evidence ts well the implications of our analysis, but could also t alternative explanations. One way to disentangle our predictions from others is to think about more specic tests. For instance, the fact that more mature industries exhibit less syndication could be due to dierent features. It could be, as we argue, that the precision of the VCs evaluation is larger in those industries. Alternatively, it could be that for some industries (e.g. services), projects require smaller amounts of investment, and VCs do not face hard capital constraints. Also, there could be some heterogeneity in mature industries, with some projects being more innovative and dicult to evaluate. Another way to test our prediction is to measure whether more drastic innovations at the rm level induce more syndication. To test this hypothesis, one could identify the product market strategies of dierent start-ups, in the spirit of the analysis of Hellmann and Puri (2000) , to dene groups of rms of dierent innovativeness. We expect syndication to be more prevalent for the most innovative rms.
In addition, some of our results highlight the importance of the level of experience of VCs for the observed value added, and the nancial return of syndicates. The empirical result of Brander et al. (2002) that standalone investments exhibit less variable returns illustrates well the case where VCs are highly experienced. It would be useful to include the level of experience of venture capitalists to create dierent groups of standalone investments. One should nd that the dierence in variability between standalone and syndicated investments should be stronger for more experienced VCs. In the same vein, the model predicts that standalone experienced VCs will exert more eort that syndicated less experienced VCs. One could introduce the level of experience of VCs when measuring value-added. Eort should increase with the level of experience of VCs, and should increase for standalone investments. An interesting feature of the model is that there can be overprovision of eort by experienced VCs. This implies that the relationship between eort and nancial returns is not monotonic, especially for high levels of experience. Empirically, this means that if one wants to investigate the relationship between eort and returns, one should take into account the level of experience of VCs, on top of the syndication decision.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the eciency of the selection process of venture capitalists. We provide a rationale for the syndication of venture capital investments based on the trade-o between the need to gather accurate information on the quality of an investment opportunity, and the need to maintain monopoly prots. We consider a model in which two venture capitalists can generate costless signals on a highly uncertain venture. Although gathering information can be prot-enhancing, collecting the second appraisal creates potential competition for the initial venture capitalist. Forming a syndicate is a coordination device that prevents prot-dissipating competition from actually taking place. Such a contract is however costly for the initial venture capitalist, since he must forgo part of the project's surplus. The higher the prots the initial venture capitalist can capture when being the sole investor, the more reluctant he is to syndicate. Therefore the actual syndication decision will not induce ecient learning. This is the rst cost of syndication. We show that this cost increases with the level of experience of the initial venture capitalist. We then relate the syndication decision to the post-investment involvement of venture capitalists. Very experienced venture capitalists nd it too costly to syndicate and do not gather enough information. Relying on their own signal, they provide too much eort. Moderately experienced VCs also nd it too costly to syndicate, and do not gather enough information. However, because of their unprecise evaluation, they do not exert enough eort.
A second cost of syndication arises when there is moral hazard on the ex post value-added eort of the initial venture capitalist. Syndication forces the two venture capitalists to share ownership of the rm, which weakens the incentives to exert eort. We establish that this cost decreases with the experience of the initial venture capitalist. Therefore syndication can also be costly for very inexperienced venture capitalists since it can alter their incentives. This results in the underprovision of eort by young or inexperienced venture capitalists.
We derive results concerning the link between the level of experience of venture capitalists, the decision to syndicate, and the intensity of their ex-post involvement.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
• To set the proof of proposition 1, we rst need to characterize the optimal investment/eort decision when VC 1 calls for a second evaluation according to the signals and the levels of experience of the two agents.
Start with the case where s 1 = H. Suppose rst that s 2 = H. With bayesian updating, we get:
Using equation (1), it follows that:
And using equation (2):
It follows that:
One checks easily that under assumption 1, ϕ e (α 1 ) ≥ ϕ I,e (α 1 ) ≥ ϕ I, e (α 1 ) ∀α 1 . Therefore, when both VCs receive good signals, it is optimal : -to invest and exert eort when α 2 > ϕ e (α 1 ), -not to invest when α 2 < ϕ I, e (α 1 ), -to invest and not exert eort when α 2 ∈ [ϕ I, e (α 1 ); ϕ e (α 1 )].
And :
Under assumption 1, ϕ e (α 1 ) ≤ ϕ I,e (α 1 ) ≤ ϕ I, e (α 1 ) ∀α 1 . Therefore: -it is optimal to invest and exert eort if α 2 < ϕ e (α 1 ), -it is optimal not to invest if α 2 > ϕ I, e (α 1 ), -it is optimal to invest but not to exert eort if α 2 ∈ [ϕ e (α 1 ); ϕ I, e (α 1 )].
Consider now the case s 1 = L.
If s 2 = L, it is clearly optimal not to invest. Suppose next that s 2 = H. Proceeding as before, we get:
And:
One checks easily that ν e (α 1 ) ≥ ν I,e (α 1 ) ≥ ν I, e (α 1 ) ∀α 1 . Also, ν I, e (α 1 ) is always larger than since N P V ( e, q L ) ≤ 0. We conclude that:
-when α 2 < ν I, e (α 1 ), it is optimal not to invest, -when α 2 ∈ [ν I, e (α 1 ); ν e (α 1 )], investment takes place, but not eort is exerted, -when α 2 > ν e (α 1 ), it is optimal to invest and exert eort.
• The second part of the proof consists in determining when the investment decision is reversed for at least one possible signal s 2 .
When s 1 = L, VC 1 does not invest alone. Hence information is valuable when VC 2 ' s signal makes the project's NPV positive. This arises when α 2 > ν I, e (α 1 ). Suppose now that s 1 = H. Dene α I the minimum level of VC 1 's experience, such that investing but not exerting eort becomes valuable after a good signal. Using equation (2), such a threshold is obtained by solving:
Dene similarly α e the minimum level of experience above which it is valuable to start exerting eort. This threshold solves:
See that:
As a consequence, under assumption 1, after receiving a good signal, it is optimal not to invest when α 1 < α I , to invest and not exert eort when α 1 ∈ [α I ; α e ], and to invest and exert eort when α 1 > α e . 
Generalization with a continuous investment model
We consider a continuous investment model to assess the robustness of our results. To give a avor of the generalization of our model, we present here the results of proposition 1, with a general investment model, for the case of an initial good signal (i.e. s 1 = H).
Consider the following continuous investment model.
For any investment level I ∈ R + , the project generates in case of success a revenue R(I). The function R on R + is such that: R (I) > 0, and R (I) < 0. The FOC of the maximization of the project's NPV when eort is not exerted gives:
Denote I e (q) the solution of equation (4). Since we have decreasing returns (R is concave), I e (q) is an increasing function of the belief q. When investment occurs, the project's NPV can be written: Note that in the binary investment choice model, we are able to specify explicitly q * I, e and I e (q), thus to solve analytically the model. Also, we can easily present the solutions graphically in a two-dimension space. All this is not possible in the general continuous investment model. This gives the following investment rule, where I * e is the optimal level of investment, given that no eort is exerted:
Similarly, the FOC of the maximization of the NPV when eort is exerted is:
Denote I e (q) the solution of equation (5) and dene q * I,e the belief such that the project's NPV, when eort is exerted, is equal to zero. The belief q * I,e veries:
The optimal level of investment, given that no eort is exerted, is dened by:
We consider that eort is not very ecient, q * I, e < q * I,e , which is equivalent to the following condition:
In our binary investment model, the inequality (6) boils down to what is referred to as assumption (1).
Dene q * e the minimum level of experience above which it is valuable to start exerting eort. This threshold solves:
Check that under condition (6), we have that q * I, e < q * e .
Initially, q 0 < q * I, e : the project is not protable. Suppose rst that VC 1 has received a good signal, but is not experienced enough to invest alone, i.e. q H < q * I, e . He asks for a second evaluation if the project's NPV becomes positive if VC 2 receives a good signal, i.e. if:
Assume now that investing but not exerting eort becomes valuable after a good signal, i.e. q * I, e < q H < q * e . VC 1 asks for a second evaluation if VC 2 is experienced enough to induce eort when receiving a good signal or to deter investment when receiving a bad signal i.e. if:
To state the results of proposition 1, check that functions ϕ R(I), e (α 1 ), ϕ e (α 1 ) and ϕ R(I), e (α 1 ) have the same properties as in the binary investment model. See that:
This implies that the minimum level of VC 2 's experience needed to trigger investment decreases with α 1 .
We have that ∂ϕ e (α 1 ) ∂α 1 < 0, so that the minimum level of VC 2 's experience needed to induce eort decreases with α 1 .
Also:
The minimum level of VC 2 's experience needed to discourage investment increases with α 1 .
Proof of proposition 2
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. Recall from the proof of proposition 1 that if s 1 = L or if s 1 = H and α 1 < α I , the optimal decision is not to invest. Hence, VC 1 decides to syndicate i:
Simplifying both sides by 1 2 gives the same condition for syndication as in the rst best.
Proof of proposition 3
Suppose that s 1 = H. The case where α 1 < α I is treated in proposition 2.
• When α 1 ∈ [α I , α e ], it is optimal for VC 1 to invest but not to exert eort when staying alone. Therefore, VC 1 syndicates i: The proof of proposition 1 states that information gathering is optimal for α 2 ≥ ϕ I, e (α 1 ), when α 1 ∈ [α I , α e ]. It is easy to check that both ϕ s, I, e (α 1 ) and ϕ s, I,e (α 1 ) are greater than ϕ I, e (α 1 ) ∀α 1 . Also note that ϕ s,e (α 1 ) < 1 is not consistent with α 1 ≥ α I . Therefore, when α 1 ∈ [α I , α e ], potential competition makes VC 1 more demanding in term of VC 2 's experience.
For consistency, we verify below whether the necessary conditions for syndication are compatible with the interval considered for α 1 and α 2 . We have ϕ s, I, e (α 1 ) ≤ 1 i:
which is compatible with some α 1 ∈ [α I , α e ].
And ϕ s, I,e (α 1 ) ≤ 1 i:
which is compatible with α 1 ≥ α I .
• When α 1 > α e , it is optimal for VC 1 to invest and exert eort when staying alone. VC 1 syndicates i: Simple computations establish that: -ϕ s,I, e (α 1 ) > ϕ I, e (α 1 ): the rst case considered does not exist, -and ϕ s, I (α 1 ) < 1 is not compatible with α 2 ≥ ϕ I, e (α 1 ). This implies that when α 1 ≥ α e , VC 1 prefers not to syndicate.
Proof of corollary 1
We know from proposition 2 that if VC 1 receives a bad signal, or if he receives a good signal but α 1 < α I , he syndicates whenever it is optimal to do so. We thus focus on the case where s 1 = H and α 1 ≥ α I . In that case, the second piece of information is used to deter investment, or to modify the eort decision. Combining the results of propositions 1 and 3, we get:
- When α 2 ∈ [ϕ e (α 1 ); ϕ s, I,e (α 1 )] VC 1 invests alone and does not exert eort while a second good signal would encourage eort. There is thus underprovision of eort.
• Suppose that α 1 ≥ α e Because of the cost of syndication, VC 1 prefers not to syndicate, and exerts eort each time he receives a good signal. The rst best information gathering requires to ask for a second signal, and stop exerting eort when a bad second signal if obtained, if α 2 ∈ [ϕ e ; ϕ I, e ]. There is thus overprovision of eort.
A numerical example of the incidence of the unobservability of eort Assume equality and call α * 2 (α 1 ) the positive root of the above equation. Thus, the inequality is true if α 2 ≥ α * 2 (α 1 ).
The following gure plots the root α * 2 (α 1 ) on gure 2 which represents the syndication and eort decision. The dashed region represents the cost of syndication due to unobservable eort. In this zone, when eort is observable, VC 1 syndicates and exerts eort when both signals are good. When eort is not observable, VC 1 syndicates but does not exert eort when both signals are good: as stated in proposition 4, moral hazard leads to underprovision of eort when VC 1 is not very experienced.
Expected value of syndicated vs standalone projects: a numerical example Under these values, assumption 1 holds.
Suppose that there are two VCs in the economy, with experience α = 0.73585 and α = 0.65. -if the more experienced VC receives the project rst, he prefers not to call for a second signal: he invests alone, and does not exert eort, after a good signal, -if the less experienced VC receives the project rst, he calls for the second signal. Therefore, we can compute the expected value of the project nanced by the more experienced VC, and compare it to the value of the project nanced by the syndicate. We get: N P V (e, q H , α 1 = 0.73585) = 5.4 N P V (e, q H,H , α 1 = 0.65, α 2 = 0.73585) = 9.9083
For these parameter values, the standalone project has a lower expected return than the syndicated project. 34 With potential competition, the less experienced VC still prefers to syndicate: 0.73585 > ϕ s, I, e (0.65), and invests i both have received a good signal. The more experienced VC prefers to stay alone and invests only after a good signal. 34 Note however that the more experienced VC earns higher expected prots than the syndicate because he nances more projects (or to put it dierently, he nances the project more often).
